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  Conditions of Citizenship and Domicile in 
Polish Restitution Regulations in Light of 
European Law 
RADOSŁAW WIŚNIEWSKI0F∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Polish restitution regulations, both proposed and currently in force, 
employ conditions of citizenship and domicile in defining the categories 
of persons authorized to obtain restitution benefits for property taken in 
connection with World War II or after the war. Such conditions were 
included in previous and current regulations concerning property 
“beyond the Bug River,” i.e. property lost in connection with the postwar 
change in Poland’s eastern borders. These conditions were included in 
reprivatization bills proposed in Poland after 1989, including the only bill 
in this area to be passed by the Polish parliament in March 2001, which 
was subsequently vetoed by President Aleksander Kwaśniewski.1F1 
Conditions of citizenship and domicile are also found in the latest 
reprivatization bill drafted by the Polish Ministry of Justice, dated 
October 26, 2017,2F2 which, at the time this article goes to press, is still at 
the stage of inter-ministerial consultations at the Government Legislation 
Center. 
Conditioning entitlement to restitution benefits on citizenship or 
domicile generates numerous controversies because the socio-political 
changes occurring during and after World War II often required the 
 
∗Lawyer in the Real Estate, Reprivatization and Private Client Practice at Wardynski & Partners, 
Warsaw, and a PhD Candidate in the Department of Human Rights at the John Paul II Catholic 
University of Lublin. 
 1. .See Decyzja Prezydenta RP w Sprawie Ustawy Reprywatyzacyjnej, PREZYDENT PL (Mar. 
22, 2001), http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwalne-aktualnosci/rok-2001/art,15,decyzja-prezydenta-
rp-w-sprawie-ustawy-reprywatyzacyjnej.html. 
 2. .Ustawa o zrekompensowaniu niektórych krzywd wyrządzonych osobom fizycznym 
wskutek przejęcia nieruchomości lub zabytków ruchomych przez władze komunistyczne po 1944 
[Law to Compensate for Some of the Harm Done to Individuals as a Result Taking Over Real 
Estate or Movable Monuments by the Communist Authorities after 1944] (draft, Oct. 26, 2017) 
(Pol.). 
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former owners of property, or their family and heirs, to leave Poland, 
which sometimes entailed the loss of Polish citizenship. Given the 
complex postwar fate of persons who survived the war and in light of the 
over forty years of the communist regime in Poland, when obtaining any 
kind of restitution benefits was nearly impossible, to require the former 
owners of property or their families and heirs to demonstrate Polish 
citizenship or domicile in Poland appears unjust, particularly, with 
respect to people forced by wartime or postwar turmoil to leave Poland. 
But regardless of the social assessment of the use of conditions of 
citizenship and domicile, such conditions continue to appear in both 
proposed and existing Polish restitution regulations. The use of these 
conditions is justified by the Polish authorities, on one hand, by the need 
to create the possibility of obtaining restitution benefits only for persons 
strongly tied to Poland and, on the other hand, by Poland’s financial 
limitations as a country that, following the transformation in 1989, is still 
striving to build its prosperity on the basis of a free-market economy.3F3 At 
the same time, this explanation seems inadequate in light of international 
agreements binding on Poland, and in particular, acts of European law, 
whose overriding principles are respect for human dignity, human rights, 
equality, justice, and the rule of law. Moreover, the Terezin Declaration,4F4 
signed on June 30, 2009, by forty-six states (including Poland), which 
addresses issues of restitution for property taken during and after the war 
in detail, requires that regulations introduced in the area of restitution of 
real property enable pursuit of restitution claims in a non-discriminatory 
manner. The guidelines drafted for the Terezin Declaration on pursuit of 
restitution claims to real property state that non-discriminatory restitution 
and compensation processes should “inter alia . . . overcome citizenship 
and residency requirements.” 5F5 
Regardless of the general objections to the use of conditions of 
citizenship and residence, on October 26, 2017, the drafters of the 
comprehensive reprivatization bill for Poland decided to include these 
criteria in the draft, apparently,6F6 because the current regulations on 
 
 3. .Justification, 3.7 & 3.14, Ustawa o zrekompensowaniu niektórych krzywd wyrządzonych 
osobom fizycznym wskutek przejęcia nieruchomości lub zabytków ruchomych przez władze 
komunistyczne po 1944 [Law to Compensate for Some of the Harm Done to Individuals as a Result 
Taking Over Real Estate or Movable Monuments by the Communist Authorities after 1944] (draft, 
Oct. 26, 2017) (Pol.).  
 4. .HOLOCAUST ERA ASSETS CONFERENCE, TEREZIN DECLARATION (June 30, 2009). 
 5. .Id. 
 6. .See Renata Krupa-Dąbrowska, Ministerstwo Sprawiedliwości przygotowało nową wersję 
projektu dużej ustawy reprywatyzacyjnej, RZECZPOSPOLITA, (Nov. 27, 2017), http://www 
.rp.pl/Nieruchomosci/311279958-Ministerstwo-Sprawiedliwosci-przygotowalo-nowa-wersje-
projektu-duzej-ustawy-reprywatyzacyjnej.html. 
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property in the former eastern borderlands have already been reviewed 
by the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) in Strasbourg, the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) in Luxembourg, and 
the Polish Constitutional Tribunal. As a result of these examinations, the 
regulations concerning property “beyond the Bug River” containing such 
conditions were not found wanting with respect to their compliance with 
the Polish Constitution7F7 or standards imposed by European law. 
Questions thus arise, including whether or not the conditions of 
citizenship and domicile used in the regulations governing property in 
former eastern lands were not undermined in the rulings of the 
Constitutional Tribunal, whether the CJEU or the ECtHR is tantamount 
to their universal compliance with standards of Polish and European law, 
and consequently, whether or not they can be employed in a 
comprehensive restitution law in Poland? Before reaching an affirmative 
answer to this question, the nature and scope of regulations concerning 
property “beyond the Bug River” and the criteria of Polish citizenship 
and residence used in those regulations must be examined. For this 
reason, I will first present the issue of property in former eastern lands 
and the related mechanism for pursuit of restitution claims. Then, I will 
examine, in detail, the conditions of citizenship and domicile included in 
the regulations governing claims for property in former eastern lands and 
how those conditions have been evaluated in the case law of the 
Constitutional Tribunal and the two European courts. 
II. EASTERN LAND ACTS AS AN EXCEPTIONAL EXAMPLE OF RESTITUTION 
REGULATIONS IN THE POLISH LEGAL SYSTEM  
The territory of Poland in the interwar period differed significantly 
from the area currently within the borders of Poland. On November 11, 
1918, when Poland regained its independence after 123 years, the image 
and conception of Polish borders was still uncertain and continued to be 
shaped over the following years. A significant portion of the eastern 
border of Poland was established pursuant to the Treaty of Riga of March 
18, 1921,8F8 under which the eastern border of Poland followed inter alia 
the Zbrucz (Zbruch) and Dźwina (Daugava) rivers, and also included 
lands east of the Bug River. This is why the territories of prewar Poland 
east of the current border are commonly referred to as lands “beyond the 
 
 7. .See Ustawa z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 r. Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej [Constitution 
of Republic of Poland of April 2, 1997] (1997 Dz. U. nr 78 poz. 483) (Pol.). 
 8. .Traktat pokoju między Polską a Rosją i Ukrainą podpisany w Rydze dnia 18 marca 1921 
roku [Treaty of Peace Between Poland and Russia and Ukraine of March 18, 1921] (1921 Dz. U. 
nr 49 poz. 300) (Pol.). 
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Bug” (zabużańskie) and their prewar inhabitants are also referred to as 
“people from beyond the Bug” (zabużanie).  
These eastern lands were cut off from Poland after the end of World 
War II. As a result of negotiations conducted before the end of the war 
among the Great Powers (the Soviet Union, the United States, and the 
United Kingdom), it was determined at Stalin’s express wish that the 
lands of prewar Poland, east of the Curzon Line9F9 (a modified version of 
which corresponds to today’s eastern border of Poland), would fall to the 
Soviet Union. Conclusion of the border agreement between Poland and 
the USSR on August 16, 1945,10F10 subsequently revised by the agreement 
of February 15, 1951,11F11 confirmed the previous arrangements agreed 
upon by the Big Three.12F12 In exchange, Poland received the prewar 
German lands east of the Oder and Lusatian Neisse rivers. Consequently, 
Poland lost about a fifth of its prewar territory, resulting in mass 
migrations of the population residing in eastern lands.13F13 
Resettlements of the population connected with removal of eastern 
lands from Poland were carried out on the basis of “republic treaties,” 
i.e., international agreements concluded after the war by Poland with the 
Soviet republics bordering Poland. Agreements were concluded at that 
time with the Soviet republics of Belarus,14F14 Ukraine15F15 and Lithuania,16F16 
 
 9. .See Letter from Lord Curzon, British Foreign Secretary, to Georgy Chicherin, People’s 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (July 11, 1920) 
(regarding the conception of a demarcation line between the Polish and Bolshevik armies proposed 
during the Polish/Bolshevik War).  
 10. .See Umowa między Rzecząpospolitą Polską i Związkiem Socjalistycznych Republik 
Radzieckich o polsko-radzieckiej granicy państwowej [Agreement between the Republic of Poland 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Polish-Soviet state border] (1947 Dz. U. nr 35 
poz. 167) (Pol.) 
 11. .See Umowa pomiędzy Rzecząpospolitą Polską a Związkiem Socjalistycznych Republik 
Radzieckich o zamianie odcinków terytoriów państwowych, podpisana dnia 15 lutego 1951 r. 
(ratyfikowana zgodnie z ustawą z dnia 26 maja 1951 r.) [Agreement between the Republic of 
Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the exchange of sections of state territories, 
signed on February 15, 1951 (ratified in accordance with the Act of May 26, 1951).] (1952 Dz. U. 
nr 11 poz. 63) (Pol.). 
 12. .See Tomasz Dubowski, Granica polsko-rosyjska jako granica zewnętrzna Unii 
Europejskiej, BIAŁOSTOCKIE STUDIA PRAWNICZE, 80-81 (2011). 
 13. .See KRYSTYNA MICHNIEWICZ-WANIK, MIENIE ZABUŻAŃSKIE: PRAWNE PODSTAWY 
REALIZACJI ROSZCZEŃ (2008). 
 14. .Agreement of September 9, 1944, between the Polish Committee of National Liberation 
and the government of the Belarusian SSR on evacuation of Polish citizens from the territory of the 
BSRR and the Belarusian population from the territory of Poland, Belr.-Pol., Sept. 9, 1944. 
 15. .Agreement of September 9, 1944, between the Polish Committee of National Liberation 
and the government of the Ukrainian SSR on evacuation of Polish citizens from the territory of the 
UkSRR and the Ukrainian population from the territory of Poland, Pol.-Ukr., Sept. 9, 1944. 
 16. .Agreement of September 22, 1944, between the Polish Committee of National Liberation 
and the government of the Lithuanian SSR on evacuation of Polish citizens from the territory of 
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and finally the USSR itself.17F17 Under these agreements, the Polish 
population residing in eastern lands were resettled to the current territory 
of Poland, and in turn, the Belarusians, Ukrainians, Lithuanians and 
Rusyns residing in Polish territory were resettled to the east. The republic 
treaties also provided various solutions in terms of settlement for property 
left behind by resettled persons, and guaranteed arrivals in the 
“Recovered Territories” (formerly German) that they would be allocated 
land and a home left by the German population resettled from those 
lands.18F18 For this reason, it is accepted that the main goal of the guarantees 
included in the republic treaties was to provide assistance to the resettled 
Polish population, thus establishing conditions for facilitating their 
existence inside the new, postwar borders of Poland. This is also why it 
is recognized that the benefits awarded for properties in the east are in the 
nature of public-law social benefits, and not private-law compensation.19F19      
Given the numerous doubts connected with the lack of ratification 
and publication of these treaties, the obligations assumed by Poland under 
international law, with respect to settlement for property left in the east, 
were not susceptible to direct enforcement.20F20 For this reason, these 
 
the LSRR and the Lithuanian population from the Territory of Poland, Lith.-Pol., Sept. 22, 
1944;these also Agreement of July 6, 1945, between the Provisional Government of National Unity 
of the Republic of Poland and the government of the USSR on the right to change of Soviet 
citizenship of persons of Polish and Jewish nationality residing in the USSR and their evacuation 
to Poland and on the right to change of citizenship of persons of Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian, 
Rusyn and Lithuanian nationality residing in the territory of Poland and their evacuation to the 
USSR, Pol.-USSR, July 6, 1945). 
 17. .Umowa między Rządem Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej a Rządem Związku 
Socjalistycznych Republik Radzieckich w sprawie terminu i trybu dalszej repatriacji z ZSRR osób 
narodowości polskiej [Agreement between the Government of the Polish People’s Republic and 
the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding the date and mode of further 
repatriation of persons of Polish nationality from the USSR] (1957 Dz. U. nr 47 poz. 222) (Pol.).  
 18. .See TOMASZ LUTEREK, REPRYWATYZACJA: ŹRÓDŁA PROBLEMU 259-261 (2016).  
 19. .See, e.g., Trybunał Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], P 1/87, June 10, 1987 (Pol.); 
Trybunał Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], K 33/02, Dec. 19, 2002 (Pol.); Trybunał 
Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], K 2/04, Dec. 15, 2004 (Pol.); Trybunał Konstytucyjny 
[Constitutional Tribunal], SK 11/12, Oct. 23, 2012 (Pol.); Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court] I CR 
768/73, Feb. 1, 1974 (Pol.); Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court] III CZP 63/79, Oct. 10, 1979 (Pol.); 
Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court] III AZP 39/92, Feb 4, 1993 (Pol.); Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny 
[Supreme Administrative Court] OSK 606/11, Apr. 26, 2012 (Pol.); Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny 
[Supreme Administrative Court] I OSK 1856/12, May 21, 2013 (Pol.); Naczelny Sąd 
Administracyjny [Supreme Administrative Court], I OSK 2201/14, November 6, 2014 (Pol.); 
Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny [Supreme Administrative Court] I OSK 1020/13, December 9, 2014 
(Pol.); Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny [Supreme Administrative Court], Case I OSK 1113/14, 
February 18, 2016 (Pol.); Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny [Supreme Administrative Court], Case I 
OSK 2025/14, May 24, 2016 (Pol.). 
 20. .See Małgorzata Masternak-Kubiak, Glosa do wyroku TK z dnia 19 grudnia 2002 r., K 
33/02 [Note on Constitutional Tribunal Judgment of December 19, 2002, Case K 33/02], 6 
PAŃSTWO I PRAWO [STATE AND LAW] 119 (2003) (Pol.); see also Roman Kwiecień, Charakter 
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obligations were incorporated into the national legal order after the war 
and implemented on the basis of various acts of national law.21F21 Until 
October 2005, these solutions generally boiled down to a right of offset, 
under which the price for acquisition of real estate (owned by the public 
entities) would be reduced by the value of property left behind in the east. 
This settlement for property left behind in the east did not take the form 
of classic compensation for injury, but was understood as a type of public 
assistance benefit for persons resettled from the east, helping them 
organize their existence in postwar Poland. Thus, the settlement 
obligations assumed by Poland in the republic treaties were in essence 
more similar to public assistance benefits of a social nature than damages 
in the traditional sense. 
The setoff right was most often exercised by the eligible persons 
during the initial resettlement period in the 1940s. Problems with the 
exercise of the setoff right began along with successive waves of 
 
prawny i znaczenie umów repatriacyjnych z 9 i 22 września 1944 roku [The Legal Nature and 
Significance of the Repatriation Agreements of September 9 and 22, 1944], 4 PRZEGLĄD SĄDOWY 
[JUDICIAL REV.] 17 (2005) (Pol.). 
 21. .See, e.g., Dekret z 6 grudnia 1946 r. o przekazaniu przez państwo mienia nierolniczego 
na obszarze ziem odzyskanych i byłego Wolnego Miasta Gdańska [the Decree of December 6, 
1946, on Transfer by the State of Non-agricultural Property in the Area of the Recovered Territories 
and the Former Free City of Danzig] art. 9 (1946 Dz. U. nr 71 poz. 389) (Pol.); Dekret z 10 grudnia 
1952 r. o cesji przez państwo nieruchomości nierolniczych na cele mieszkaniowe i budowę 
indywidualnych domów jednorodzinnych [Decree of December 10, 1952, on Cession by the State 
of Non-agricultural Real Property for Residential Purposes and Construction of Individual Single-
family Houses] art. 14 (1952 Dz. U. nr 49 poz. 326) (Pol.); Dekret z 18 kwietnia 1955 r. w sprawie 
uwłaszczenia i uregulowania innych spraw związanych z reformą rolną i rozliczeniem rolnictwa 
[Decree of April 18, 1955, on Enfranchisement and Regulation of Other Matters Connected with 
Agricultural Reform and Agricultural Settlement] art. 12 (1955 Dz. U. nr 18 poz. 107) (Pol.); 
Ustawa o sprzedaży przez państwo budynków mieszkalnych i działek budowlanych z 28 maja 1957 
[Act on Sale by the State of Residential Houses and Construction Plots of May 28, 1957] art. 8 
(1957 Dz. U. nr 31 poz. 132) (Pol.); Ustawa o gospodarce gruntami w miastach i majątkach [Act 
on Management of Land in Cities and Estates of July 14, 1961] art. 17b (1961 Dz. U. nr 32 poz. 
159) (Pol.); Ustawa o gospodarce gruntami i wywłaszczaniu nieruchomości [Act on Management 
of Land and Expropriation of Real Estate of Apr. 29, 1985] art. 88 (1985 Dz. U. nr 22 poz. 99) 
(Pol.); Ustawa o gospodarce nieruchomościami Skarbu Państwa przejęta od Sił Zbrojnych 
Federacji Rosyjskiej [Act on Management of Real Estate of the State Treasury Taken Over from 
the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation of June 10, 1994] art. 16 (1997 Dz. U. nr 70 poz. 363) 
(Pol.); Ustawa o gospodarce nieruchomościami [Real Estate Management Act of Aug. 21, 1997] 
art. 212 (1997 Dz. U. nr 115 poz. 741) (Pol.); Ustawa o przekształceniu prawa użytkowania 
wieczystego przysługującego osobom fizycznym w prawo własności [Act on Conversion of the 
Right of Perpetual Usufruct Held by Natural Persons into the Right of Ownership of Sep. 4, 1997] 
art. 6 (1997 Dz. U. nr 123 poz. 781) (Pol.); Ustawa o stosowaniu się do ceny sprzedaży lub opłat 
za wieczyste użytkowanie nieruchomości Skarbu Państwa o wartości nieruchomości pozostawionej 
poza bieżącymi granicami państwa polskiego [Act on Application Toward the Sale Price or Fees 
for Perpetual Usufruct of Real Estate of the State Treasury of the Value of Real Estate Left Beyond 
the Current Borders of the Polish State of Dec. 12, 2003] (2003 Dz. U. nr 6 poz 39) (Pol.). 
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resettlements22F22 in the 1950s and later, when further regulations governing 
the right of setoff imposed numerous conditions on eligible persons 
which had to be fulfilled for them to exercise their right of setoff.23F23 The 
growing restrictions on the exercise of setoff rights led to a situation 
where the exercise of this right was the exception rather than the rule. 
Moreover, when it was possible to exercise the right of setoff, the factual 
and legal state of the real property offered to the holders of this right was 
so complicated or problematic that holders often abandoned their exercise 
of the right of setoff. Under those circumstances, the right of setoff 
became an illusory legal institution (ius nudum), as the conditions for 
exercising it prevented its effective realization.24F24 
The applicant in Broniowski v. Poland,25F25 in which the ECtHR 
decided for the first time to issue a pilot judgment, struggled with similar 
problems. Under the facts of that case, the applicant’s grandmother was 
resettled after the war from land now in Ukraine. The applicant’s mother 
managed to exercise the right of setoff inherited from her mother by 
acquiring real property worth barely two percent of the value of the 
property left behind in the east by her mother. In subsequent years, after 
long proceedings, when the applicant finally managed to reach a situation 
where he could exercise the remaining right of setoff, the property offered 
to him for this purpose had such a complicated factual and legal state 
(among other things, requiring significant investments in the property or 
located in a distant part of the country of no interest to the applicant) that 
he ultimately abandoned his exercise of the right of setoff. Moreover, 
further regulations concerning property “beyond the Bug” prevented 
exercise of the right of setoff by holders who, like the applicant, had 
already exercised the right of setoff in any manner regardless of the value 
of the real estate acquired through this procedure. In this situation, the 
ECtHR concluded that the regulations in the Polish legal system and the 
practice for exercise of the right of setoff reduced it to an illusory right, 
resulting in Poland’s violation of the applicant’s right of property (the 
 
 22. .See MICHNIEWICZ-WANIK, supra note 13.   
 23. .See generally Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], I CK 323/02, Nov. 21, 2003 (Pol.) (in 
which the court describes in detail the circumstances limiting the possibility of exercising the right 
of setoff, indicating that this provides grounds for a claim for damages against the State Treasury).  
 24. .See Jan Mojak, Glosa do uchwały SN z dnia 22 czerwca 1989 r., III CZP 32/89 [Comment 
on Supreme Court Resolution of June 22, 1989, Case III CZP 32/89), 1 PAŃSTWO I PRAWO 1991, 
119; see also K 33/02 at 1. 
 25. .Broniowski v. Poland, 2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 185-187.  
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peaceful enjoyment of possessions)26F26 guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol 
127F27 to the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”).28F28 
In light of the structural problems of the Polish legal system with 
the realization that claims for eastern properties affect a large portion of 
the entitled persons, the ECtHR decided for the first time in the 
Broniowski case to apply the procedure of a pilot judgment.29F29 Thus, the 
court also required Poland to implement solutions enabling effective 
realization of “Bug River claims” (as the court calls them) in a manner 
consistent with the standards of Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR. The 
aim of issuing a pilot judgment was not only to resolve the applicant’s 
specific case,30F30 but also to impose an obligation for a systemic solution 
to the problem with Bug River claims. This, in turn, could reduce the 
number of identical claims pending before the ECtHR31F31 and, in the longer 
term, reduce the number of new applications filed with the court in 
similar cases.  
The immediate result of the judgment in Broniowski v. Poland32F32 was 
the adoption of the Act on Realization of the Right to Compensation for 
Real Property Left Beyond the Current Borders of the Republic of Poland 
of July 8, 2005 (2005 Dz. U. no. 169 item 1418, as amended— 
hereinafter the “2005 Act”). The 2005 Act introduced an alternative to 
realization of Bug River claims in the form of a setoff, by enabling right 
holders to apply for monetary compensation. In this respect the 2005 Act 
limited the ability to realize Bug River claims to twenty percent of the 
 
 26. .See id.  
 27. .See Protocol 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, March 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262 (promulgated in Poland under 1995 Dz. U. nr 36 
poz. 175 (Pol.)).   
 28. .See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (promulgated in Poland under1993 Dz. U. nr 61 poz. 284) (Pol.)). 
 29. .For more on the pilot judgment procedure, see FREDERIC SUDRE, DROIT INTERNATIONAL 
ET EUROPEEN DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 848 (2012) (Fr.). 
 30. .Broniowski’s case ended in 2005 in a friendly settlement with the Polish government, 
under which Broniowski was awarded monetary compensation under the same terms as adopted in 
the act passed as a result of issuance of the pilot judgment, i.e. compensation equal to 20% of the 
value of real property left in the east by his grandmother, notwithstanding prior exercise of the right 
of setoff equal to 2% of the value of the lost property. As a result of the settlement, the ECtHR 
struck the case from the list of pending cases. See Broniowski, 2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1; see also 
Magda Krzyżanowska-Mierzewska, Sprawy mienia zabużańskiego przed ETPCz (Bug River 
Property Case Before the ECtHR), 12 EUROPEJSKI PRZEGLĄD SĄDOWY 23 (2008) (Pol.). 
 31. .The ECtHR registrar announced the reduction in the number of identical cases resulting 
from issuance of the pilot judgment in Broniowski v. Poland in two press releases on December 12, 
2007 and October 6, 2008 . See Press Release, Eur. Court of Human Rights, Bug River Cases 
Resolved (Dec. 12, 2007); see also Press Release, Eur. Court of Human Rights, First ‘Pilot 
Judgment’ Procedure Brought to a Successful Conclusions: Bug River Cases Closed (Oct. 6, 2008). 
 32. .See Broniowski, 2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1. 
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value of property left in the east. Thus right holders may seek realization 
of the right of setoff or seek payment of compensation equal to twenty 
percent of the value of former eastern properties. 
The 2005 Act entered into force on October 7, 2005, and in 2007 the 
ECtHR found in Wolkenberg v. Poland33F33 and Witkowska-Toboła v. 
Poland34F34 that the aims of the pilot project in Broniowski were being 
achieved.35F35 The court held that the mechanism for pursuing Bug River 
claims applied in the 2005 Act met the standards under Article 1 of 
Protocol 1 to the ECHR. In this context, the court pointed out that Poland 
had a wide margin of appreciation in regulating the method of pursuing 
Bug River claims, and within that discretion, the mechanism applied in 
the 2005 Act was reasonable, proportionate, and struck a fair balance 
between the protection of the claimants’ property rights and the general 
interest.36F36 The Strasbourg judges stressed that the level of compensation 
for Bug River claims set in the 2005 Act, twenty percent of the value of 
the property left behind, was fair, particularly considering that the loss of 
the real estate in the east did not result from any act or omission of the 
Polish authorities but resulted from the political arrangements by the 
Great Powers that were connected with defining the postwar borders of 
Poland.37F37 The ECtHR also noted that the settlement for property left in 
the east was in the nature of aid rather than restitution, which provided 
further justification for limiting the level of payment of Bug River claims 
to twenty percent of the value of the properties left in the east.38F38 
The history of the regulations governing Bug River claims reveals 
the exceptional nature of these regulations within the Polish legal system. 
 
 33. .Wolkenberg v. Poland, App. No. 50003/99, Eur. Ct. H.R., 72-77 (2007). 
 34. .Witkowska-Toboła v. Poland, App. No. 11208/02, Eur. Ct. H.R., 74-79 (2007).   
 35. .See Krzyżanowska-Mierzewska supra note 30, 22-25 (raising serious doubts as to the 
complete success of the pilot judgment in Broniowski v. Poland.) The use of this procedure led to 
adoption of the 2005 Act in Poland, but until it was adopted nothing happened in many of the Bug 
River cases pending before the ECtHR, see id. The author thus seems to suggest that the success 
from the court’s perspective was the systemic solution to the issue, as a result of which the number 
of cases and incoming applications was reduced, see id. But from the perspective of protection of 
individual rights, the applicants could expect only significant percentage limitation on their claims, 
while the one advantage was the assurance of being able to obtain monetary compensation, see id. 
But the latter solution, the author suggests, could have been achieved in any event without the 
judgment from the Strasbourg court, in light of the legislative work underway at the same time and 
the development of the Polish case law inclining toward monetary satisfaction of Bug River claims, 
see id. 
 36. .See Wolkenberg, App. No. 50003/99, Eur. Ct. H.R., 64, 66; see also Witkowska-Tobola, 
App. No. 11208/02, Eur. Ct. H.R., 66-67.  
 37. .See Wolkenberg, App. No. 50003/99, Eur. Ct. H.R., 63; see also Witkowska-Tobola, 
App. No. 11208/02, Eur. Ct. H.R., 65.  
 38. .See Wolkenberg, App. No. 50003/99, Eur. Ct. H.R., 64; see also Witkowska-Tobola, 
App. No. 11208/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. 66.  
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This exceptional nature consists, first and foremost, of the fact that this is 
one of the few examples of restitution regulations aimed at satisfying 
claims arising out of the seizure of real property after World War II. As 
the conference sessions clearly show, Poland lacks comprehensive 
systemic solutions for satisfaction of restitution claims for the seizure of 
property after World War II. Instead of the reprivatization act demanded 
for years, claimants pursue their rights in ad hoc proceedings based on 
general instruments of private and public law.39F39 On the other hand, the 
uniqueness of the regulations governing property “beyond the Bug” also 
arises from the very source and nature of the benefits that can be obtained 
through settlement for properties left in the east. As articulated by the 
ECtHR, Bug River claims take their original source not in acts or 
omissions of the Polish authorities, but in postwar political arrangements 
by the Great Powers. In addition, the Strasbourg judges perceived the 
assistance-based nature of the benefits available when pursuing Bug 
River claims, which are not aimed at full compensation for the financial 
loss connected with the loss of Bug River property but at the mitigation 
of the effects of resettlement.40F40 For these reasons, the regulations 
governing Bug River claims cannot be regarded as an example of 
restitution regulations in the classic sense, which are aimed at redressing 
the injury arising out of seizure of property after World War II. Due to 
the exceptional nature of the Bug River claims, the solutions followed in 
the current 2005 Act should be carefully analyzed before replicating them 
in other laws. This observation also applies to the conditions of 
citizenship and domicile, which, as examples of exceptional solutions, 
should be applied with particular caution in other types of restitution 
regulations, as I will discuss later in this article. 
III. CONDITION OF CITIZENSHIP IN EASTERN LAND ACTS 
Holding Polish citizenship (both at the start of the war and at the 
time of assertion of the demand) as a criterion for pursuing Bug River 
claims was not introduced into the Polish regulations governing 
properties left in the east until 2003. But this does not mean that the 
condition of Polish citizenship is not bound up with the occurrence and 
nature of Bug River claims.41F41  
 
 39. .See Ewa Łętowska, Orzecznictwo sądowe jako instrument reprywatyzacji 
zdekoncentrowanej, in STUDIA I ANALIZY SĄDU NAJWYŻSZEGO TOM III 86 (Mateusz Pilich ed., 
2016). 
 40. .See Wolkenberg, App. No. 50003/99, Eur. Ct. H.R., 63; see also Witkowska-Tobola, 
App. No. 11208/02, Eur. Ct. H.R., 65. 
 41. .See Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], III CZP 84/90, Apr. 10, 1991 (Pol.). 
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The use in national regulations of Polish citizenship as a condition 
for enforcing Bug River claims was challenged in 2004 in a proceeding 
before the Polish Constitutional Tribunal.42F42 In that case, the tribunal 
pointed out that, despite failure for over fifty years to employ the 
condition of citizenship in the national regulations governing Bug River 
property, the condition of Polish citizenship was strongly accented in the 
republic treaties which conditioned the possibility of settlement for 
property left in the east on holding Polish citizenship as of September 
1939. The tribunal found that the essence of this requirement for claims 
was the desire to ensure living conditions enabled resettled Polish citizens 
to begin their lives over again in a new location within the postwar 
borders of Poland. In the tribunal’s view, the ratio legis for the criterion 
of holding Polish citizenship reveals the social nature of the benefits 
obtained through exercise of Bug River claims, which, by their nature, 
are closer to public-law aid benefits than to civil-law damages. Moreover, 
in the tribunal’s view, the external nature of the circumstances 
surrounding the original causes of the resettlement of Polish citizens and 
the principles behind the claims for properties left in the east justify the 
use of the criterion of Polish citizenship in the mechanism for pursuing 
Bug River claims. Thus, in light of the specific circumstances of the 
sources of the postwar actions of resettling the Polish population, as well 
as the exceptional public-law nature of the benefits received in exercise 
of Bug River claims, the Constitutional Tribunal ultimately held that the 
condition of Polish citizenship for pursuing Bug River claims is 
consistent with the Polish Constitution. 
Interestingly, in the context of the constitutionality of the 
requirement to hold Polish citizenship, the Constitutional Tribunal also 
cited the principle of the citizens’ trust in the state and affirmed that this 
principle applies directly only to Polish citizens, confirming the 
consistency with the principle of the condition of holding Polish 
citizenship. The tribunal added that the principle of citizens’ trust in the 
state with respect to the criterion of Polish citizenship could be relied on 
by a non-citizen only, secondarily, in terms of equal treatment of citizens 
and non-citizens, for example, under EU law. This issue later became the 
subject of analysis by the CJEU under the procedure for obtaining a 
preliminary ruling. But the Luxembourg court did not analyze the 
criterion of holding Polish citizenship in September 1939 on the part of 
resettled persons and examined the issue of the requirement to hold Polish 
 
 42. .See K 2/04 at 2. 
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citizenship also by heirs asserting claims of resettled persons who had a 
right of setoff under the regulations governing property beyond the Bug.  
In the Teisseyre case,43F43 two grandchildren of a woman who was 
resettled in Poland sought payment of compensation under the 2005 Act 
for the property left in the east by their grandmother, who held Polish 
citizenship. One of the grandchildren held Polish citizenship and was 
awarded compensation, while the other was denied compensation 
because he lacked Polish citizenship. He was a Finnish citizen who had 
never resided in Poland. Under these facts, the Supreme Administrative 
Court, hearing a complaint against the refusal to award compensation due 
to the lack of Polish citizenship by one of the heirs of the resettled owner, 
sought a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice on the compatibility 
of this requirement of the 2005 Act with the prohibition of discrimination 
on grounds of nationality provided for in Article 18 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union.44F44 Examining its jurisdiction to take 
up the case, the Court of Justice stated that the prohibition in Article 18 
TFEU concerns discrimination within the scope of application of the 
Treaties, including the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaties, 
and in particular, the right to move and reside freely in the territory of the 
member states under Article 21 TFEU.45F45 Beyond that, the court 
recognized that the subject matter of the case and the 2005 Act lies within 
the exclusive competence of the member states,46F46 s the aim of the concept 
of EU citizenship under Article 20 TFEU is not to expand the scope of 
application of the Treaties to matters unrelated to the law of the European 
Union (“EU”).47F47 Because the grandson resided in Finland, and never in 
Poland, the Court of Justice found that the case had no connection with 
situations covered by the Treaty provisions concerning the free 
movement of people, including Article 21 TFEU.48F48 Consequently, the 
Court held that it clearly lacked jurisdiction to reply to the question 
referred by the Supreme Administrative Court. 
While the Court of Justice found that the ratione materiae did not 
justify taking the case, this does not mean that the condition of Polish 
citizenship in the Polish regulations governing Bug River claims is 
 
 43. .Case C-370/13, Teisseyre v. Minister of Treasury, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2033 (Court of 
Justice order of June 19, 2014).  
 44. .See Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 18, 2012 O.J. C 326/1. 
 45. .See Case C-370/13, Teisseyre v. Minister of Treasury, 31. 
 46. .See AURELIA NOWICKA & STANISLAW SOŁTYSIŃSKI, REFLEKSJE NA TEMAT 
REKOMPENSAT ZA MIENIE ZNACJONALIZOWANE PO II WOJNIE ŚWIATOWEJ 56 (M Mateusz Pilich 
ed.). 
 47. .See Case C-370/13, Teisseyre v. Minister of Treasury, 32–33.  
 48. .See Case C-370/13, Teisseyre v. Minister of Treasury, 34. 
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clearly consistent with EU law, or the prohibition on discrimination on 
grounds of nationality set forth in EU law. As expressly stated by the 
Luxembourg judges, the principal basis for the order was that the case 
lacked a connection with the free flow of persons under the facts of the 
case, namely that the heir of the resettled owner who was not a Polish 
citizen had not resided in Poland. A contratrio, it may be assumed that 
under different circumstances, if the heir lacking Polish citizenship had 
exercised the right to move freely within the territory of the member 
states and resided in Poland, then the Court of Justice would be inclined 
to take the case.49F49  
Additionally, it has been pointed out that a ruling on the merits by 
the Court of Justice would also have been possible if another of the Treaty 
freedoms were raised, namely the free flow of capital set forth in 
Article 63 TFEU.50F50 It is accepted in the case law of the CJEU that 
inheritance is an example of the flow of capital of a personal nature.51F51 
However, limiting this type of flow of capital due to the type of 
citizenship held could manifest discrimination on grounds of nationality, 
as referred to in Article 18 TFEU.52F52 Thus, it cannot be ruled out that in 
the future, notwithstanding the order in Teisseyre, the Court of Justice 
will provide a reply on the merits as to the condition of citizenship in the 
Polish regulations governing Bug River claims, where it might conclude 
that a limitation of this type violates the EU’s prohibition of 
discrimination on grounds of nationality. 
It should be pointed out that when issuing the order in the Teisseyre 
case, in the description of the facts, the Court of Justice also noted the 
exceptional, public-law and assistance-related nature of the benefits 
obtainable by pursuing Bug River claims.53F53 So, even if a merits ruling 
were to be issued in the future where the Court of Justice upheld the 
compatibility with EU law of the use of the criterion of citizenship in 
Polish regulations governing Bug River claims, the exceptional nature of 
restitution regulations awarding claimants public-law benefits in the 
nature of assistance, rather than civil-law damages, would have to be 
borne in mind. 
Currently, it would not be correct to claim that the Court of Justice 
has accepted the use of the condition of citizenship in the Polish 
 
 49. .See NOWICKA & SOŁTYSIŃSKI, supra note 46, at 53–54.  
 50. .See Maciej Taborowski, Mienie zabużańskie nie dla Trybunału Sprawiedliwości? 
[Territorial Property not for the Court of Justice?], 155 RADCA PRAWNY 39, 40 (Pol.). 
 51. .See Case C-513/03, Hilten-van der Heijden, ECLI:EU:C:2206:131, 40 (Court of Justice 
judgement of Feb. 23, 2006). 
 52. .See Taborowski, supra note 50, at 40.  
 53. .See Case C-370/13, Teisseyre v. Minister of Treasury, 10–11. 
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restitution regulations as compatible with the prohibition of 
discrimination on grounds of nationality. First and foremost, given the 
procedural nature of the order issued in Teisseyre, as of now, there is no 
merits ruling by the Luxembourg court on this issue. Even if such a ruling 
were issued, the holding would have to be analyzed in light of the 
exceptional nature of the regulations governing Bug River claims. 
IV. CONDITION OF DOMICILE IN EASTERN LAND ACTS 
As with the condition of citizenship, the condition of domicile (the 
need to have resided in Poland in September 1939 and now) was not 
included in the national regulations governing Bug River claims until 
2003. Unlike the criterion of citizenship, residence in Poland was not an 
explicit requirement under the republic treaties. Nonetheless, the 
condition of residing in prewar Polish lands falls within the range of 
principles underlying settlement for property left behind in the east as a 
form of assistance for the Polish population, who, because of the change 
in borders, had to be resettled and lost their previous place of residence 
in eastern lands. For this reason, in 2004, the Constitutional Tribunal held 
that the criterion of place of residence, in light of its link to the ratio legis 
of the regulations governing settlement for property left in the east, is 
consistent with the Polish Constitution.54F54 In the same judgment, however, 
the tribunal found that requiring claimants to reside in Poland today, as 
of a strictly defined date (i.e. the date of entry into force of the 
regulations), was not relevant to the obligation to settle for property left 
in the east, and consequently, this requirement was held to be 
unconstitutional.55F55 For this reason as well, in the 2005 Act, the criterion 
of domicile was included only with respect to the period when the war 
broke out, in the form of a requirement of residence in the former 
territories of Poland as of September 1, 1939. With the condition of 
domicile constructed in this manner, the Constitutional Tribunal issued 
another judgment in 2012, holding that it arbitrarily established access to 
the benefits provided by the 2005 Act by conditioning such benefits on 
the incidental fact of residing in the former territories of Poland on 
September 1, 1939.56F56 In the tribunal’s view, setting such an exact date as 
the legally relevant moment for determining the criterion of domicile 
could deprive persons of the benefit of the 2005 Act, who, despite not 
residing in the former territory of Poland on that exact date, nonetheless 
lost the center of their life interests due to the war and the following 
 
 54. .See K 2/04 at 2. 
 55. .See id.  
 56. .See SK 11/12 at 23. 
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resettlement from the east.57F57 Thus, the tribunal held that the criterion of 
domicile in this form was unconstitutional. Consequently, the 2005 Act 
was amended in 2014 so that the requirement of residence in the former 
territory of Poland would not be limited to any specific date. Thus, the 
2005 Act retains the condition of domicile, determining the social nature 
of the Bug River claims with respect to Polish citizens who lost their place 
of residence as a result of resettlement. However, this criterion now 
extends the operation of the Bug River regulations to all persons 
potentially entitled to the assistance benefits provided for in the 
regulations.58F58 
So far, neither the CJEU, nor the ECtHR has examined the 
compatibility of the condition of domicile in the Bug River regulations 
with standards of European law. Although the conclusions in the Court 
of Justice order in the Teisseyre case, discussed in the previous section, 
were focused on the criterion of citizenship, the arguments raised in that 
case also referred indirectly to issues connected to the place of residence. 
First and foremost, in the request for a preliminary ruling in that case,59F59 
the Supreme Administrative Court cited the ruling by the Court of Justice 
in Tas-Hagen and Tas.60F60 In that judgment, the Luxembourg court held 
that the requirement that Dutch citizens establish permanent residence in 
the Netherlands in order to become beneficiaries of the assistance benefits 
paid to civilian victims of the war violated the EU’s prohibition of 
discrimination on grounds of nationality. The Court of Justice concluded 
that the citizenship requirement was sufficient to demonstrate a 
connection between the recipients of assistance benefits and the society 
of the member state awarding the benefits. The additional requirement of 
domicile had no rational justification and imposed disproportionate 
conditions for access to the social benefits.61F61 
 
 57. .See id.  
 58. .See Piotr Nycz, Zamieszkiwanie na byłym terytorium Polski jako przesłanka otrzymania 
rekompensaty z tytułu pozostawienia nieruchomości poza obecnymi granicami Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej [Residence in the former territory of Poland as a condition for receiving compensation for 
real estate left beyond the current borders of the Republic of Poland], 12 PREGLAD SĄDOWY 85, 
92 (Pol.). 
 59. .See Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny [Supreme Administrative Court], I OSK 2024/11, 
Apr. 30, 2013 (Pol.). 
 60. .See Case C-192/05, Tas-Hagen and Tas, ECLI:EU:C:2006:676 (Court of Justice 
judgment of Oct. 26, 2006); see also Case C-370/13, Teisseyre v. Minister of Treasury, 37 (holding 
that it was not justified to rely on the judgment in Tas-Hagen and Tas, as the Tases were citizens 
of the Netherlands residing in that member state before exercising the freedom of movement and 
settling in another member state, Spain, while Teisseyre, who did not hold Polish citizenship, 
resided in Finland and had never resided in Poland).  
 61. .See Case C-192/05, Tas-Hagen and Tas, 38–40.  
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The issue of the place of residence during the period of receipt of 
social benefits intended for victims of war and persecution was also 
analyzed by the Court of Justice in the Nerkowska case.62F62 In the court’s 
view, Polish citizenship and prolonged residence in Poland by a recipient 
of assistance benefits for victims of war manifested sufficient ties of the 
beneficiary with Poland as a member state awarding social benefits to its 
citizens, even if the beneficiary exercised the freedom to move and took 
up residence in another member state.63F63 Thus, the court deemed the 
condition of having a place of residence in Poland for the period of 
collecting assistance benefits for victims of war by Polish citizens 
residing in other member states as incompatible with the principle of 
proportionality, and held that this condition does not comply with the 
EU’s ban on discrimination on grounds of nationality. 
Despite the lack of findings by the CJEU and ECtHR on the 
permissibility of the criterion of domicile in the Bug River regulations, 
the conditions for permissibility of the use of the condition of place of 
residence when regulating access to assistance benefits for victims of 
war, which falls within the competence of the EU member states, may be 
cited. These considerations lead to the conclusion that access to social 
benefits awarded by the member states may be conditioned on a 
connection between the beneficiaries and the member state awarding the 
benefits. However, establishing the criteria for verifying the strength of 
this connection requires particular care and weighing of the interests of 
society and the potential beneficiaries. In the judgments cited above, the 
Court of Justice held that conditioning the receipt of social benefits for 
victims of war on both citizenship and domicile may be disproportionate 
and violate the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality. 
Thus, simultaneous employment of the conditions of residence and 
citizenship when establishing the conditions for access to assistance 
benefits in EU member states may be permissible only in exceptional 
circumstances justifying such a combination of criteria. The resettlements 
connected with the postwar change in Poland’s borders may be regarded 
as such an exceptional set of circumstances to justify the combined use 
of citizenship and domicile during the resettlement period, as provided in 
the current wording of the 2005 Act. The public-law nature of the 
assistance benefits available under the 2005 Act enables the acceptance 
of the simultaneous use of both of these conditions when determining the 
applicants’ connection to the fortunes of the Polish population resettled 
 
 62. .Case C-499/06, Nerkowska v. ZUS, ECLI:EU:C:2008:300 (Court of Justice judgment of 
May 22, 2008). 
 63. .See Case C-499/06, Nerkowska v. ZUS, 43. 
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from the east following the war and consequently eligible for assistance. 
Therefore, it is the social character of the benefits and the exceptional 
nature of the circumstances for awarding such benefits that are the 
decisive factors permitting the member state to use the place of residence 
as an eligibility criterion. 
V. SUMMARY 
The analysis presented here allows for a few summary remarks.  
First, the regulations governing property beyond the Bug are an 
exceptional example of restitution regulations in the Polish legal system. 
This results from the absence of comprehensive restitution regulations in 
Poland, as well as, the specific context in which properties in Poland’s 
former eastern lands were lost. Unlike the seizure of property in the 
postwar territory of Poland as a result of acts or omissions by the Polish 
authorities, the Bug River properties were left in the east as a result of 
arrangements by the Great Powers as to the postwar borders of Poland, 
independent of the Polish authorities. The exceptionality of the Bug River 
regulations is further evident in the public-law nature of the assistance 
benefits that could be obtained under these regulations. In view of these 
exceptional aspects, the ECtHR held that the mechanism for pursuing 
Bug River claims set forth in the 2005 Act is consistent with the standards 
under Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the European Convention on Human 
Rights. But this does not mean that any restitution regulation employing 
similar solutions would automatically be consistent with the ECHR 
standards for protection of the right to property. 
Second, use of the conditions of citizenship and domicile in 
regulating access to Bug River benefits has not yet been evaluated on the 
merits as to its compliance with standards of European law. Nonetheless, 
the existing CJEU case law permits the use of the condition of citizenship 
or domicile in light of the special nature of social benefits, whose 
regulation lies within the competence of the member states. But the 
simultaneous use of the conditions of citizenship and domicile must be 
justified by extraordinary circumstances, as the decisions by the Court of 
Justice indicate that requiring combined fulfillment of both of these 
criteria may lead to a finding of a violation of the EU’s prohibition against 
discrimination on grounds of nationality. 
Third, the exceptional nature of the regulations governing Bug River 
property and the permissibility of employing citizenship and domicile as 
conditions for obtaining those assistance benefits excludes the possibility 
of incorporating the solutions from the Bug River regulations, 
particularly the criteria of citizenship and place of residence, in a 
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comprehensive reprivatization act. That would unjustifiably equate the 
aims and character of these two regimes. The aim of the Bug River 
regulations was to carry out an intergovernmental obligation of Poland 
involving the award of assistance benefits of a public-law nature to the 
resettled Polish population from the east, while the aim of a 
comprehensive reprivatization regulation should be to award damages of 
a private-law nature. Thus carrying over the conditions of citizenship and 
domicile to the bill for a reprivatization act dated October 26, 2017, 
erroneously equates the aims and legal nature of this proposed act with 
the regulations governing Bug River properties. For this reason as well, 
their use in the proposed reprivatization act does not ensure compliance 
with standards of European law, and to the contrary, may lead to a finding 
that they are incompatible with the standards arising under the law of the 
Council of Europe and the European Union. 
 
